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Martin: Superfund Settlements

COMMENTS

A PRESCRIPTION TO EXPEDITE
HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUPS:
DE MINIMIS SETTLEMENTS
AND ADR
I.

OVERVIEW

Thousands of hazardous waste sites exist throughout the
country leeching toxics into the soil, groundwater, and the air.l
The consequences have meant tragic health problems, such as
unusually high rates of cancer and birth defects in areas near
toxic dump sites, as well as complete devastation of
communities. 2
The government responded with an environmental cleanup
bill called the Superfund 3 - a kind of environmental "Superman" designed to clean up all designated toxic sites. Yet the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) "Superman" doesn't
actually clean, rather, it demands that those who contribute to a
site's contamination, pay for its cleanup.· It carries a sword to
enforce its policy - a sword which inflicts strict liability on ev1. As many as ten thousand toxic waste sites exist across the country which "may
now cost more than $100 billion to clean up - the equivalent of $400 for every U.S.
resident . . . . Our poisoned atmosphere is expected to cause up to one million additional cases of skin cancer over each seventy-year lifetime in the United States alone"
and thirty out of fifty states now have contaminated groundwater. J. HOLLENDER, How
TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE (1990) at 99.
2. See infra notes 18-19.
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675
(West 1983 & Supp. 1990))[hereinafter CERCLA).
4. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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eryone it touches. II Not surprisingly, everyone runs from this
sword, for it could mean inequitable results. For example, the
small business that delivers a barrel of waste to a site could get
struck with a disproportionate percentage of liability if the major toxic waste contributor is not found. s Sometimes hundreds of
these small or de minimis contributors account for less than one
percent of the total hazardous waste at a site. 7 With everyone
runmng from the sword, few negotiated settlements are
attained. s
The EPA has attempted to make prOVISIOns for the de
minimis parties to mitigate the harshness of Superfund's strict
liability and cash them out of settlement negotiations. 9 However,
the use of this tool has been nominal. 10
5. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 107 at 2781 (codified at V.S.C.A. § 9607(a)). This section establishes the scope of liability under Superfund.
6. A small manufacturer in Norwood, Massachusetts may go bankrupt because land
they acquired was found to be contaminated with PCBs, allegedly caused by an engineering company 20 to 30 years earlier. Superfund imposes strict liability on "innocent"
landowners who did not contribute to the hazardous waste on their property, but who
should have known about the contamination at the time of purchase. Telephone interview with Cameron Kerry, attorney for the manufacturing company (Jul. 11, 1990).
7. For an example, see infra note 66.
8. The following is a chart of Superfund settlements to date. Jumps in the number
of settlements seem to correspond with the EPA settlement incentives issued in guidance
documents. In 1983, the EPA issued an interim settlement policy, and at the end of
1986, Congress adopted amendments to Superfund including more settlement incentives.
The weak start seems to reveal EPA's unwillingness to engage in settlement negotiations.
Fiscal Year
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

# of settlements

5
10
21
34
98
135
132
123
221

amount of settlement (in millions)
2.1
60.3
22.8
108.2
185.4
152.1
159.1
199.7
494.3

Telephone interview with a member of the Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement division (Feb. 4, 1991).
9. In return for a cash premium paid to the EPA, de minimis parties can be relieved
of almost all liability, provided they meet certain criteria. See generally infra notes 5059 and accompanying text.
10. Testimony at a congressional hearing in June 1988 revealed "that de minimis
settlements have received a 'relatively low priority,' that Headquarters management allocated only 'one-half staff year per region.' " At that time only 5 de minimis settlements
had been negotiated. The EPA had only budgeted for 13 in fiscal year 1989. Letter from
John D. Dingell to The Honorable Lee M. Thomas (Sept. 7, 1988), and response letter
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Over the last decade, as lawmakers pondered why
Superfund was resulting in few settlements, and hence, few
cleanups,l1 alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques to
expedite settlement negotiations began gaining in popularity.I2
However, despite new amendments to Superfund in 1986 to create settlement incentives (which included arbitration for small
cost recovery claims),13 and the increasing awareness and approval by the federal government for alternative dispute resolution,14 negotiated settlements using ADR techniques are still not
commonplace. III
As de minimis contributors can be some of the hardest hit
by Superfund's liability-inflicting sword of enforcement, this
comment discusses de minimis settlements in conjunction with
ADR techniques as a solution to expedite the settlement process
and hasten hazardous waste cleanups. In sum, the EPA seems
willing to utilize ADR, but is unwilling to loosen its grip on the
sword. In order for new settlement techniques to work, the EPA
must hand the sword over to alternative dispute resolution.
The first section discusses the history of Superfund and its
1986 amendments, with a focus on de minimis contributors and
why the de minimis settlement incentive has failed. The second
section focuses on alternative dispute resolution and analyzes
the government's attempts at incorporating arbitration into
Superfund. Lastly, the comment suggests incorporating arbitration provisions into the de minimis section of Superfund.
from Edward E. Reich to Deputy Regional Administrators (Jul. 19, 1988), reprinted in
Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 207,
244 (1988).
11. This is largely due to the time and expense it takes to litigate a case as opposed
to negotiating a settlement.
12. The EPA began to nominate cases for ADR in 1987. As of September, 1990, 21
cases had been nominated, 20 for mediation techniques, and one for a mini-trial. However, out of the 20 nominated, only 12 Superfund cases actually utilized a form of alternative dispute resolution. Telephone interview with David C. Batson, Esq., Alternative
Dispute Resolution Liaison, Superfund Division of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance, Environmental Protection Agency (Feb. 4, 1991).
13. See infra note 126.
14. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 12.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

HISTORY OF SUPERFUND AND THE BIRTH OF THE
SETTLEMENT

De Minimis

The Superfund bill, officially entitled the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA)18 emerged from heightened public and congressional knowledge of the tragic consequences caused by hazardous chemicals that were improperly disposed.1 7 Incidents such as
Love Canape and Times Beach l9 prompted Congress to quickly
assemble and pass 20 a bill establishing a national inventory of
hazardous waste sites,21 and response mechanisms 22 which would
enable the government to expedite cleanups of those sites that
posed an immediate threat to public health or the
environment. 28
CERCLA created two methods for compelling the clean up
of hazardous waste sites. First, under section 104,24 the EPA
16. CERCLA, supra note 3.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1016(1), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONGo ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120 [hereinafter Legislative History P.L. 96-510).
18. The incident at Love Canal involved 352 million pounds of dioxin-contaminated
chemical waste in three Hooker chemical disposal sites near Niagra Falls, NY. Serious
threats to public health caused the evacuation of 230 families from the region and the
devaluation of property values. "Love Canal health data shows elevated miscarriage and
birth defect rates." Legislative History P.L. 96-510, supra note 17, at 6121-6122.
19. A massive dioxin contamination in Missouri which inflicted thousands of people.
20. Grad, A Legislatiue History of CERCLA, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). Grad
states that CERCLA "was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan group of senators. . .
in the closing days of the lame duck session" of the 96th Congress. It was considered and
pas'sed, after very limited debate, in a situation that allowed for no amendments. The
House was forced to take it, or leave it, and chose to take it "groaning all the way."
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(8)(B) (West 1983). At the time of CERCLA consideration
(1979), "the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 sites existed, of which
between 1,200-2,000 present[ed) a serious risk to public health." Legislative History P.L.
96-510, supra note 17, at 6120. Of these, 400 were selected "superfund sites" to warrant
immediate attention by the federal government. By 1985, the EPA had identified over
800 "superfund sites." F. Habicht, Encouraging Settlements Under Superfund, 1 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 3 (1985).
22. The President could either clean first, and sue for cost recovery, or force the
responsible party to clean up via a civil suit or administrative order. See infra notes 2426.
23. Legislative History P.L. 96-510, supra note 17, at 6119. 400 sites were initially
- chosen for priority cleanup, and CERCLA authorized $600 million for a "4-year Hazardous Waste Response Fund to be drawn from industry-based fees and Federal appropriations .... " Legislative History P.L. 96-510, supra note 17, at 6120.
24. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 104 at 2774, (42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (West 1983)). This
section entitles the President to respond by removal or remedial action whenever there is
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may use the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund 2C1 to respond to threatened releases of hazardous waste and recover
costs by instituting a civil action against the responsible parties
under section 107. 26 Second, under section 106,27 the EPA can
compel private parties to clean up the site either through an administrative order or through a civil suit. Yet, realizing the expense of cleaning up the sites and the incredible transaction
costs 28 incurred in litigation, the goal of Superfund became encouraging the use of negotiated settlements to promote private
party cleanups.29
One method CERCLA employed to encourage settlements
was imposing far-reaching joint and several strict liability30 on
the persons responsible for the improper disposal, the current
owners or operators of the site, and the transporters of wastes to
the site. 31 Ostensibly, this would convince responsible parties to
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment.
25. Id. § 201 at 2796 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(k)(4)(A), (c) (West 1983)). The infamous
"fund" of Superfund is created by taxes on certain toxic products to be paid generally by
the persons using or exporting those toxics.
26. Id § 107 at 2781 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983)). This section establishes
the scope of liability under Superfund.
27. Id. § 106 at 2780 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (West 1983)). Abatement Actions.
28. See infra note 36.
29. F. Habicht, Encouraging Settlements Under Superfund, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T. 3 (1~85). Habicht, Assistant Attorney General of the Land and Natural Resources
Division of the Department of Justice, explained that the primary goal of Superfund
should be private party cleanups through negotiated settlements as they were prompt
and cost-effective. He did note however that the Department of Justice's basic practice is
to litigate while negotiating, saying that litigation strengthens the government's negotiating posture and fulfills their statutory responsibility under CERCLA. Unwilling to diminish the advantages of litigation, he notes that CERCLA's policy should be a balance
between litigation and negotiation, with negotiation as the preferred strategy as negotiation is far more amenable to issues that are complex and technical.
30. Strict joint and several liability imposes liability on potentially responsible parties, regardless of fault, for the entire cleanup of the site. Each is responsible for the
entire cost of the. cleanup even where the party's contribution to the hazardous waste site
was minimal. However, several Superfund cases have held that where the harm is divisible, the liability will be allocated appropriately. See T. Garrett, Superfund: Apportionment of Liability, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 25 (1985).
31. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 107(a) at 2781 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983)).
This describes the scope and harshness of Superfund's liability provision. Named parties
are liable for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State, any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person,
and damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
The only defenses established are acts of God, acts of war, or acts or omissions of a third
party other than an employee or agent in connection with a contractual agreement. Id. §
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settle rather than face a lawsuit by the Department of Justice. 32
However, after 195 negotiated settlements in five years from a
national priority list that had grown to 500 sites, the EPA realized that to achieve more settlements, it needed to provide positive incentives for parties to come forward and pay their full
share. 33 Consequently, in 1985, the EPA published its first CERCLA settlement policy containing additional settlement incentives and procedures for EPA officials to utilize in negotiating
settlement proposals. 34
One of these settlement incentives mitigated the liability
provisions for de minimis parties by cashing them out of the settlement process. 311 Previously, a potentially responsible party,
who contributed only minimal hazardous waste, incurred transaction costs defending a lawsuit that were disproportionate to
their relative responsibility at the site. 36 The situation hurt not
107(b)(I-3).
32. See Habicht, supra note 29, at 5. Habicht describes the litigation process with
the EPA as vigorous and well-planned, thus inducing parties to settle.
33. Balcke, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments,
74 VA. L. REV. 123 (1989). Potentially responsible parties claimed that the EPA "relied
too heavily on the coercive threat of joint and several strict liability, and did not offer
positive incentives for coming to voluntary agreements." [d. at 132. See also Hazardous
Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5035 (1985) [hereinafter 50 Fed. Reg.
5034) (" ... voluntary cleanups are essential to a successful program for cleanup of the
nation's hazardous waste sites."); Stoll, infra note 36, at 45. (Authors note that the EPA
shoulq practice some of its more "positive tenets" to promote more settlements and expedite the national cleanup program).
34. 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, supra note 33, at 5034. Briefly, this policy contains general
principles for the EPA's review of private-party cleanup proposals; management guidelines for negotiation; factors governing release of information to potentially responsible
parties; criteria for evaluating settlement offers; partial cleanup proposals; targets for
litigation; timing for negotiations; and management and review of settlement
negotiations.
35. The EPA instituted other settlement tools as well. 1) The EPA changed its policy of only settling with those private parties willing to contribute 80 percent of a site's
cleanup costs, enabling the regions to negotiate settlements whenever a private party
made a substantial offer. 2) The EPA allowed fund dollars for orphan shares (that
amount attributable to insolvent or unknown PRPs). 3) In order to facilitate settlements,
the EPA agreed to release site information to the PRPs. See id. at 7.
36. Stoll, Graham, Need for Changes in EPA's Settlement Policy, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 7 (1985). Transaction costs include "the time and money expended by
inside counsel, technical employees, businessmen, outside counsel and consultants in
technical studies, negotiations or litigation." [d. at 9. Transaction costs drastically inflate
the overall cost of cleanup. In one case, half of the $1.5 million settlement "represents
salary costs for DOJ attorneys and paralegals," totaling $600,000. See Krickenberger,
Rekar, Superfund Negotiators Suggest ADR As Way to Break Settlement Logjam, 3
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 242, 244 (1989).
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only de mm£mis parties, but the major potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) and EPA as well. For instance, at many sites,
hundreds of parties are found potentially responsible, yet only
10 to 20 parties may represent those most responsible for the
hazardous condition of the site. 37 This situation would significantly impede settlement negotiations, as hundreds of de
minimis parties would clutter up negotiations with the major
contributors.38
The EPA acknowledged in the settlement policy that the
regional offices could enter into negotiations with PRPs "even
though the offers do not represent a substantial portion of the
cleanup costs. 1139 However, the EPA did not encourage de
minimis settlements nor promote them in their settlement policy.40 With no procedure established for the regional offices to
remove de minimis parties from the settlements, either by negotiations or cash outs, no such settlements were achieved. 41
When Superfund came up for reauthorization in 1986, Congress realized that CERCLA was not meeting its intended goa1. 42
Despite its 1985 settlement policy created to expedite cleanups,
the Superfund program in its first five years spent $1.6 billion
and started or completed clean up at only 45 of the 400 sites on
37. Stoll, supra note 36, at 9.
38. N. Bernstein, To Clean Up Landfills, the Leader Should be Municipalities Using Economic Incentives to Settle, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10012 (1989). '
39. 50 Fed Reg 5034, supra note 33, at 5042. Originally, the EPA would only negotiate with those parties willing to pay one hundred percent of the cleanup costs. In 1983,
the EPA decided to entertain settlements that accounted for 80 percent of the site's
cleanup costs. The new settlement policy in 1985 did away with these arbitrary thresholds. See Stoll, supra note 36, at 7. .
40. "Substantial resources should not be invested in negotiations with de minimis
contributors in light of the limited costs that may be recovered, the time needed to prepare the necessary legal documents, the need for headquarters review, potential res judicata effects, and other effects that de minimis settlements may have on the nature of the
case remaining to the Government." 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, supra note 33, at 5036.
41. The first de minimis settlement was the Ottati & Goss site in 1987. See also
Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.
181 (1988)(statement of Richard L. Hembra, Associate Director Resources, Community,
and Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office) "[A)ccording to an
EPA official, no agreements of this [de minimis) nature were entered into under [EPA's
settlement) policy."
42. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 54 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2836 [hereinafter Legislative History P.L. 99499).
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its priority list. 48 In addition, Congress discovered that as many
as 10,000 Superfund sites existed across the nation, with an estimated aggregate cleanup cost of $100 billion. 44 In contrast, when
Congress drafted CERCLA in 1980, it had estimated that only
1,200-2,000 hazardous waste sites existed that warranted federal
attention.411 Realizing that the EPA would never have the money
or the personnel to address the cleanup of the thousands of
abandoned hazardous waste sites across the nation, Congress
drafted the Superfund Amendments Reauthorization Act
(SARA)48 of 1986 with the underlying goal of ensuring rapid
cleanups by private parties. 47
Although Congress believed that encouraging negotiated
cleanups would accelerate the rate of cleanup and reduce its expense by tapping into the private sector, Congress and the EPA
reinforced the notion that its settlement policy was not intended
to replace or diminish its strong and aggressive enforcement policy.48 Thus, with the competing goals of facilitating cleanups
while assuring a strong set of legal enforcement standards, Congress employed four general settlement incentives in SARA: 1)
cashing out de minimis contributors and landowners, 2) granting
releases from liability to settling parties, 3) encouraging the
EPA to enter into partial settlements, and 4) offering contribu. tion protection. 49
SARA set out the procedure to address de minimis parties
which the EPA's original settlement policy left out. First, SARA
defined two categories of de minimis parties: de minimis contributors and de minimis landowners.60 De minimis contributors
are those parties who contributed a comparatively low amount
of hazardous substances relative to volume or toxicity.61 Realizing that this definition did not adequately apply to non-contrib43. [d.
44. [d. at 2837.

45. Legislative History P.L. 96·510, supra note 17, at 6120.
46. SARA, infra note 50, at 1615.
47. Legislative History P.L. 99·499, supra note 42, at 2882.
48. [d. at 2883.
49. Balcke, supra note 33, at 135.
50. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L.
No. 99·499, § 122(g), 100 Stat. 1613 [hereinafter SARA).
51. [d. § 122(g)(1) at 1685.
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uting landowners who acquire liability under Superfund,1I2 the
Judiciary Committee amended an earlier draft of SARA to include such "innocent" landowners in de minimis settlements.1I3
Hence, SARA defined de minimis landowners as owners of contaminated property who did not contribute any hazardous substance to the site nor have actual or constructive knowledge of
the contamination at the time of purchase. 1I4 SARA authorized
the EPA to enter into expedited final settlements with these two
categories of de minimis parties "whenever practicable and in
the public interest."1I11 If the PRP qualified as de minimis, the
party would pay a premium to the EPA to mitigate the risks
involved in early settlements. liB The EPA in return for the payment would issue a covenant not to sue ll? to ensure the end of
the de minimis party's potential liability. "Both types of de
minimis settlements are intended to relieve the covered parties
from prolonged and costly litigation"1i8 while allowing the EPA
to receive cash to clean up sites - consequently simplifying settlements with the remaining major PRPs. The EPA hoped that
the establishment of the de minimis provision would increase
the "numbers of voluntary settlement agreements ... [b]ecause
de minimis contributors may be attracted by the advantages offered by section 122(g) settlements, and non-de minimis parties
may be encouraged to settle as a result of the revenues raised
52. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 107 at 2781. Superfund imposes liability on landowners, regardless of fault. If the landowners can prove that they acquired the contaminated
property without knowledge or reason to know of its contamination, they are eligible for
the innocent owner defense under 107(b)(3). The de minimis provision creates a mechanism for this category of landowners to cash out of the settlement, avoiding unnecessary
transaction costs. If the EPA does not grant the party de minimis status, the landowner
can litigate liability in a court of law.
53. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3279.
54. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(1)(B) at 1685. See also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 31 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS
3054 [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. Rep.).
55. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(1) at 1685. "Expedited Final Settlements.-Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the President, the President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement with a potentially responsible party in an administrative or civil action under section 106 or 107 if
such settlement involves only a minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned.... "
56. These risks include cost overruns during the completion of the remedial action
and the risk that further response action will be necessary in addition to what is known.
57. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(2) at 1685.
58. Judiciary Comm. Rep., supra note 54.
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through such agreements. "119

B.

OBSTACLES TO

De Minimis

SETTLEMENTS

Several months after SARA was signed into law,80 the EPA
issued interim guidelines on settlements with de minimis waste
contributors (guidance for de minimis landowners was not written until nearly two years later).81 "This document provides
guidelines for determining which potentially resp'onsible parties
('PRPs') under section 107(a) of ... CERCLA ... as amended
by . . . SARA . . . may qualify for treatment as de minimis
waste contributors pursuant to section 122(g)(1)(A) of SARA."
It also provides guidelines for negotiating and settling with such
contributors.82 Yet, the guidance on de minimis contributors
conflicts with SARA's underlying goal of encouraging expedited
settlements. Critics suggest that this is because the EPA fears
"criticism for settling too cheaply at the cost of delaying settlement and increasing transaction costs to itself and the PRPs."83
Others suggest that EPA officials favor a strong enforcement
policy over any settlement devices. 8" Whatever the specific reason, the guidelines reveal that EPA's hesitance to enter into de
minimis settlements is attributable in part to the following
deficiencies.
First, because of vague language and inadequate defiriitions,
PRPs are at the mercy of the EPA to decide their de minimis
status. The guidelines dictate "that the de minimis contributor
59. Superfund Program: De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24333,
24334 (1987) [hereinafter 52 Fed. Reg. 24333). This is because the more money received
in cash outs from the de minimis contributors, the less money the major contributors
will be held liable for from the EPA.
60. President Reagan signed Public Law 99-499 on October 27, 1986. President's
Statement Upon Signing H.R. 2005, 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1412 (Oct. 27, 1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 3441.
61. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59. For the EPA's guidelines for de minimis
landowner settlements, see Superfund Program: De Minimis Landowner Settlements,
Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34235 (1989).
62. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24333-24334.
63. Bernstein, Summarizing Certain Provisions and Issues Under the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 349 PRAC. L. INsT. 13 (1988).
Bernstein suggests that early settlements involve risk to the government. Id. at 12. See
also Bernstein, supra note 38.
64. See Bernstein, supra note 38.
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will be defined on a site-specific basis. "66 To qualify as a de
minimis contributor, the party's contribution to the site must be
comparatively low in volume or toxicity.66 If the EPA determines that the PRP's contribution meets the volume and toxicity requirements, the settlement must be determined to be
"practicable and in the public interest. "67 As Congress did not
provide definitions for "whenever practicable and in the public
interest"68 or "minor portion of the response costs"69 or "minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances,"7o the interpretation is left to the EPA. 71 Thus a de minimis contributor
will have to incur further transaction costs while waiting for the
EPA to determine the party's eligibility for this settlement tool.
Second, although the guidelines specifically articulate that
the de minimis settlement goal is "to resolve [the party's] liability quickly and without the need for extensive negotiations with
the Government,"72 the implications of the guidelines dictate
otherwise. Specifically they state, ". . . as a general rule, de
minimis settlements should not be concluded prior to completion of a PRP search (including title search and financial assess65. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24335. Section IV states, "the approach
taken by this guidance ... is that the de minimis contributor will be defined on a sitespecific basis. To qualify as a de minimis generator or transporter, the PRP must have
contributed an amount of hazardous substances which is minimal in comparison to the
total amount at the facility. The PRP must also have contributed hazardous substances
which are not significantly more toxic and not of significant greater hazardous effect than
other hazardous substances at the facility, as well as meeting the other conditions set
forth in this guidance." [d. at 24335-24336.
66. For example, "at the Cannons Engineering disposal site in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, de minimis settlement documents which have been accepted by over two hundred fifty parties have been criticized by major contributors as allowing too large a share
of the total contribution to be settled for too small an amount too early in the process.
EPA set 1 percent or less as the de minimis contribution amount, which ineligible parties claimed was too high a threshold. . . . By contrast, at the Maxey Flats nuclear disposal site in Morehead, Kentucky, EPA has been criticized by small volume contributors
for resisting an expedited de minimis settlement where over four hundred of the five
hundred named parties each is listed as having contributed one-tenth of 1 percent of the
waste or less." J. Ruhl, Solid and Hazardous Waste, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 35, 36
(1988).
67. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24336. See also, supra note 55.
68. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(1) at 1685.
69. [d.
70. [d. § 122(g)(I)(A) at 1685.

71. Mays, EPA Enforcement Policies Under SARA: An Analysis of Guidelines, on
Releases, De Minimis Settlements, NBARS, and Mixed Funding, 349 PRAC. L. INST. 18
(1990).
72. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24336.
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ments) or prior to such time as the Agency is confident that adequate information about the extent of each settling party's waste
contribution to the site has been discovered. "73 A PRP search
and remedial investigation/feasibility study (RIIFS) could take
years to complete, consequently preventing the de minimis
party from saving transaction costs and cashing out early in the
settlement process. 7• Although the cash premiums that de
minimis parties pay when settling exist to mitigate the EPA's
risk when negotiating early settlements, the EPA still insists on
extensive data, inhibiting any expedited settlement process. 75
Third, even after years of extensive information gathering
during which transaction costs accumulate, and even after the
de minimis party pays a cash premium to the EPA, the de
minimis contributor is still not guaranteed a full release from
liability. Almost admitting its fear of de minimis settlements,
the guidelines mandate that "in order to protect the Agency. . .
settlements should in most cases, also include a reservation of
rights which would allow the Government to seek further relief
from any settling party if information not known to the Government at the time of settlement is discovered.. "76
Fourth, although the guidelines suggest that the EP A
should encourage small parties to organize and present settlement offers to the Agency,77 the EPA has essentially been insti73.Id.
74. Bernstein, supra note 38, at 7. The author states that even after years of study
and litigation, the EPA is usually reluctant to conclude that it is confident about the
total costs of cleanup. One field study alone took the EPA sixteen months to complete.
Such a field study included collection of soil samples from all over the site, monitoring of
wells, sampling and analysis of water and sediments, and an aerial mapping. Norwood
PCB Site, Norwood, Massachusetts, EPA Region 1 Press Release, (Nov. 1988).
75. See Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 181, at 186-193, (1980) (statement of Richard L. Hembra, Assoc. Dir.
Resources, Community, and Econ. Dev., G.A.O.)[hereinafter Hearing #100-203). In a
study on two de minimis settlements requested by the Subcommittee on Oversite and
Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, a major impediment in the
settlement process is the EPA's belief that it did not have sufficient information to reliably estimate clean up costs to pursue the settlements, even though the potentially responsible parties and their contributions to the pollution at the sites were generally
known for several years.
76. E.g., 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 59, at 24337.
77. "De Minimis parties should be encouraged to organize and present multi-party
settlement offers to the government." Id. at 24334.
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tuting a reactive role, waiting for de minimis parties to come to
them with a settlement proposal. 78 Yet conflicts among PRPs
and cost allocation disputes are the more common causes of impasse in the settlement process, which in turn slow ongoing negotiations with the EPA.79 Unfortunately, the EPA's guidance is
silent on when and how regional offices should encourage potential de minimis parties to settle and when and to what extent
regional offices should conduct negotiations to bring about a
settlement.80
By 1988, the EPA had completed only one de minimis settlement in 15 months. 81 Consequently, members of the House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation ordered the EPA
to compile a report on the status of all sites on the National
Priority List (NPL) contemplated to involve de minimis parties. 82 Further, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce requested testimony on the de minimis guidelines of 1987 during a
hearing to assess the EPA's progress in implementing SARA.83
The testimony suggested "that de minimis settlements have received a relatively low priority in EPA's Superfund enforcement
program. "84
78. Hearing #100-203, supra note 75, at 182.
79. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially Responsible
Parties: The Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 ENVTL. L. INsT. 10158 (1988). For example,
in a study on de minimis settlements a settlement was significantly delayed due to the
EPA's reactive role. Despite a request from legal counsel from one group of de minimis
parties that the EPA enter into the negotiations, the EPA held back, hoping the de
minimis parites and the steering comittee for the major parties could come to an agreement. Yet, due to conflicting interests among the parties, this did not happen. Hearing
#100-203, supra note 75, at i91.
80. See Hearing #100-203, supra note 75, at 192. Recently, "the EPA suggested to
its regional offices that they 'consider pursuing a more proactive approach towards de
minimis settlements.' " Id. at 182.
81. Letter from John D. Dingell, Dennis E. Eckart, Norman F. Lent, and Dan
Slickman, to Administrator of the EPA, Lee Thomas (Feb. 9, 1988), reprinted in Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988).
82. Id. at 20.
83. Hearing #100-205, supra note 75, at 181.
84. Id. at 190. The EPA in Region V admitted that "settlements for overall site
cleanup have a higher priority than the attainment of de minimis settlements, although
these [regional] officials are aware of the benefits such settlements can provide to the
overall settlement process. An official stated that prior to SARA, limited funding slowed
Superfund work, creating a backlog of site studies and cleanup decisions. Since SARA,
with its mandated cleanup time frames, region V's focus has been on completing the
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Thus, although the EPA's goal is to resolve de minimis parties' liability quickly and without the need for extensive negotiations with the government, few de minimis parties will be able
to settle, and those that do will likely face lengthy and tedious
negotiations. 811
III. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A.

BACKGROUND

Several months after the EPA published its interim guidelines on de minimis contributor settlements, EPA published another guidance document on another settlement tool: alternative
dispute resolution (ADR).86
Alternative dispute resolution encompasses techniques and
procedures that utilize third-party neutrals to assist adversaries
in reaching an agreement. 87 The primary processes are negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and minitrials. 88
Arbitration is a private dispute resolution procedure (contrasted with public adjudication provided by courts and administrative agencies) which the involved parties design to serve
their particular needs. 89 In general, arbitration agreements provide for joint selection and payment of the arbitrator, objective
standards on which the arbitrator's decision will be based, and
procedural rules to be applied by the arbitrator.9o Courts usually
respect the resulting decision of the arbitrator as final and binding, consequently discouraging future appeals td the courts and
making the final decision of the arbitrator meaningful,91
studies and remedy selections and obtaining overall site cleanup agreements with responsible parties. As a result, the de minimis process has received little regional staff
time and effort.... " [d. at 190-191.
85. Whitlock, De Minimis Settlement Prouisions of the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 16 COLO. LAW. 643 (1987).
86. Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in Enforcement Actions, published in 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 35123 (1987) [hereinafter ADR Guidance].
(De Minimis guidelines were published in June, 1987, ADR guidelines in August, 1987).
87. Rennie, Kindling the Enuironmental ADR Flame: Use of Mediation and Arbitration in Federal Planning, Permitting, and Enforcement, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10479
(1989).
88. For an overview of alternative dispute resolution, see S. GOLDBERG & E. GREEN &
F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)[hereinafter Goldberg, Green & Sander].
89. [d. at 189.
90. [d.
91. [d.
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A mediator, in contrast, has no power to impose a final decision. Rather, the parties reach their own agreement with the assistance of the mediator.92 The involvement of the parties in formulating the final agreement usually results in greater
satisfaction and a higher level of compliance than with judicial
decrees. 93
The mini-trial is a dispute resolution hybrid process that
combines elements of negotiation, mediation, and adjudication. 9 "
The parties sign a procedural agreement that can be similar to
rules of civil procedure, informally exchange key documents, and
select a mutually acceptable neutral advisor to preside over the
mini-trial. 9 !! Unlike the arbitrator or judge, the neutral advisor
has no authority to make a binding decision, but the presider
may ask questions that probe the strengths and weaknesses of
each party's case. 9S
Alternative dispute resolution in environmental disputes
(environmental ADR) first came to fruition in 1973 in a case
that employed mediation to resolve a long-standing dispute over
a proposed flood control dam. 97 Environmental disputes offer
several differences from the traditional disputes 98 which may
have slowed the initial acceptance of using alternatives in this
area. For example, environmental cases can involve issues having
irreversible effects on the environment, the disputes can typically involve multiple parties (some claiming to represent the interests of the wildlife or inanimate objects), and implementation
of the environmental agreement may pose further problems. 99
Yet, the timeliness and cost of litigation gave way to creative
dispute resolution techniques in the environmental arena. 100 In
the decade following the success of the Snoqualmie River mediation, mediators and facilitators were employed in over 160 envi92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at

91.
92.
271.
272.

97. [d. at 406, excerpt from G. Bingham, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A
DECADE OF EXPERIENCE. The author chronicles the Snoqualmie River Dam in Washington state.
98. [d. at 404.
99. [d.
100. Dubasek & Silverman, Environmental Mediation, 26 AM. Bus. L. J. 539. See
also Goldberg, Green, & Sander, supra note 88, at 406.
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ron mental disputes in the United States. IOI
Although the private sector began to employ alternative dispute resolution techniques, the government was skeptical on using ADR in enforcement cases. 102 The government seemed to
fear appearing weak on enforcement because they were allocating some of their control to a third party. lOS Consequently, the
use of ADR in environmental enforcement actions was
limited. 104
Finally, in 1987, the Environmental Protection Agency's Administrator, Lee Thomas, stated that he viewed ADR as a new,
cheaper, and potentially more effective enforcement tool than
traditional methods. 1011 He issued guidance to the EPA regional
offices on ADR techniques in environmental enforcement actions
describing the characteristics of enforcement cases suitable for
ADR, procedures for approval of cases for ADR, procedures for
selection of third-party neutrals and procedures for management
of ADR cases. 10e The guidance only pertains to non-binding
forms of dispute resolution and notes that any EPA use of ADR
techniques would not mean more lenient results for violators or
a weaker EPA enforcement position.l07 This cautious approach
has kept government far behind private sector use of ADR.108
101. Goldberg, Green, & Sanders, supra note 88, at 406
102. See generally, Mays, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental En-

forcement: A Noble Experiment or a Lost Cause? 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10098 (1988). The
author explains that the federal government has resisted attempts to apply ADR to environmental enforcement cases and notes that only with support from both the government and the private sector will ADR succeed.
103. Id. See also ADR Guidance, supra note 86, at 35124.
104. Rennie, supra note 87.
105. Id.
106. ADR Guidance, supra note 86.
107. Id. at 35124. Specifically the guidance states, "EPA does not mean to indicate
that by endorsing the use of ADR in its enforcement action, it is breaking away from a
strong enforcement position. On the contrary, the Agency views ADR as merely another
tool in its arsenal for achieving environmental compliance...Since ADR addresses only
the process (and not the substance) of case resolution, its use will not necessarily lead to
more lenient results for violators; rather, ADR should take EPA to its desired ends by
more efficient means."
108. Pou Institutionalizing ADR in Federal Agencies 3 Alternatives Newsl. (ABA)
I, at 3 (1989). Senator Grassley (R-Iowa), who introduced an ADR bill in Congress stated
that "most federal agencies lag behind private and other public entities that must resolve disputes." Arbitration Provisions of ADR Bill Are Controversial at Senate Hearing, 3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 331 (1989).
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In an effort to spark agency use of ADR techniques, Senator
Grassley (R-Iowa) introduced the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act l09 which authorizes and encourages use of ADR for
resolution of agency disputes. llo Specifically, the bill mandated
that each federal agency adopt a policy that addresses the use of
alternative dispute resolution, and that each agency designate
senior officials responsible for administering the policy.lll The
bill provides for training on a regular basis on ADR techniques
such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, and calls for
confidentiality of ADR proceedings unless the parties agree otherwise. ll2 More controversial is the bill's authorization of binding as well as non-binding uses of dispute resolution
techniques. 1l3
In the Senate Hearings on the bill, most of the concern
arose from the Department of Justice (DOJ) who claimed that
the bill's binding arbitration provisions were unconstitutional.lI4
The DOJ stated· that the arbitrator could be considered an officer of the United States, but would not be appointed under
Article II, §2, clause 2 of the Constitution with the advice and
consent of the Senate, or be subject to executive supervision. lUi
Second, the DOJ argued that binding arbitration does not follow
precedent, which DOJ stated was important to the coherent application of law and principles. lI6 Despite DOJ concerns, the
American Bar Association testified at the hearing that the arbitrator was not an officer of the United States because the use of
arbitration is voluntary and the parties involved define the scope
of the proceedings. 117
With the authorization of binding arbitration still contained
in the bill, Congress passed the bill at the end of the 101st Congress with the hope that it will enhance the operation of the
109.
110.
(1989).
111.
112.
113.
114.

S. 971, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter S.971).
[d. See also, New Laws and Bills, 3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION REP.

202

3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 202.
[d.
[d.
Arbitration Provisions of ADR Bill Are Controversial at Senate Hearing, 3
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 331 (1989).
115. [d. at 332.
116. [d.
117. [d.
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Government and better serve the public. ll8

B.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SUPERFUND

Recently, ADR experts and environmentalists have been realizing the suitability of dispute resolution techniques for
Superfund cases.l19 In addition to a number of pilot projects 120
on the subject, the American Arbitration Association recently
sponsored a seminar program on ADR techniques in Superfund
cases. 121 Some reasons for this suitability between ADR and
Superfund include Superfund's harsh strict joint and severalliability standards (increasing the probability that if a PRP litigated, that party may be stuck with 100 percent of the clean up
costs), the complexity of Superfund cases (causing excessive
court time in explaining to juries the technicalities of the issues
at stake), and the elimination of many of the larger legal issues
(they are usually clarified by environmental studies on the site),
leaving only smaller legal questions to be litigated. 122
In fact, the Superfund amendments of 1986 (SARA)12S include arbitration provisions for cost recovery settlements not exceeding $500,000 dollars.12' Yet, as tl:te EPA's goal is to en118. H.R. 2497, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 148 CONGo REC. S18225 (1990), Pub. L. No.
101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990).
119. A few major works on this topic include: Gilbert, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Superfund: A Research Guide, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 803 (1989), Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 2 DUKE L. J. 261 (1985),
Cassel, Negotiating Better Superfund Settlements, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. S1l7 (1989).
120. Susskind, The Special Master as Environmental Mediator, 17 ENVTL. L. REP.
10239 (1987).
121. The seminar, given in several places across the country, was entitled Superfund
Simplified: Arbitration, Mediation and other ADR Techniques in Environmental Disputes. At the Seminar in San Francisco co-sponsored by the Environmental and Water
Law Section of the Bar Association of San Francisco, two EPA officials sat on the panel,
three environmental attorneys, a representative from California's Office of Environmental Affairs, and a representative from Bechtel Environmental Inc. See also U.S. Not Motivated in CERCLA Disputes to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution, ENv'T. REP. (BNA)
(Jun. 27, 1990).
122. Rennie, Kindling the Environmental ADR Flame: Us of Mediation and Arbitration in Federal Planning, Permitting, and Enforcement, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,479
(1989).
123. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 [hereinafter SARA).
124. SARA, supra note 125, § 122(h)(2) at 1686. This section states, "Arbitration in
accordance with regulations promulgated under this subsection may be used as a method
of settling claims of the United States where the total response costs for the facility
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courage private party cleanup without use of the "fund",l2& if
the EPA finds viable PRPs, it would rather enforce the liability
provisions of CERCLA 126 to mandate that the PRPs pay for 100
percent of the cleanup, than invoke the fund and sue for cost
recovery.1lI7 Cost recovery cases could arise with unwilling
PRPS,128 or in emergency response actions.1lI9 The infrequency of
cost recovery suits and the relatively small amount involved
make arbitration less risky for the federal government and thus
a likely candidate for the use of ADR. Yet, despite the EPA
guidelines on arbitration procedures for small cost recovery
claims,130 no cost recovery cases have been arbitrated to date. 131
As the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of
Justice have final discretionary authority over the suitability of
a claim for arbitration, as long as government fears ADR, arbitration cases under SARA will be nominal. 132
concerned do not exceed $500,000 (excluding interest). After consultation with the Attorney General, the department or agency head may establish and publish regulations for
the use of arbitration or settlement under this subsection."
125. See supra note 29.
126. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, at 2781 (codified at 42 V.S.C.A. §§
9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990» [hereinafter CERCLA).
127. Krickenberger & Rekar, Superfund Negotiators Suggest ADR As Way to
Break Settlement Logjam, 3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 242 (1989).
128. [d. The authors describe cost recovery scenarios, explaining that at one extreme, there is no known PRP and no potential for cost recovery. At the other extreme
- the enforcement led extreme - all PRPs at a site are known and viable, and all costs
are paid by these PRPs. At both extremes there is no cost recovery. In between the
extremes is the case of the agency having identified viable but unwilling PRPs, or having
settled with some PRPs but only for a portion of the costs.
129. Telephone Interview with David C. Batson, Esq, Alternative Dispute Resolution Liaison, Superfund Division of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance, Environmental Protection Agency (Feb. 4, 1991). (EPA will engage in an emergency removal
action when site is extremely hazardous and dangerous). (For example, at a PCB-contaminated Norwood site in Massachusetts, EPA initially cleaned up hot spots of PCB
contamination in 1983, and is presently still engaged in settlement negotiations for the
remaining costs of remedial action. Telephone Interview with Cameron Kerry, Attorney,
Mintz Levin, Boston, Massachusetts (July 11, 1990».
130. Arbitration Procedures for Small Superfund Cost Recovery Claims, 54 Fed.
Reg. 23164.
131. Telephone conversation with David Batson, see supra note 131.
132. [d. Also, telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, Esq., Senior Attorney and
Administrator for the Hazardous Substance Arbitration Panel, California State Office of
Environmental Affairs, (Feb. I, 1991). Both governmental figures suggest this because
little monetary incentive exists for government agencies to implement ADR. Department
of Justice budgets are determined by the number of cases filed, not the number of cases
settled.
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In addition to EPA's demonstrated fear of appearing weak
on enforcement,133 other obstacles to EPA's implementation of
ADR include the regional offices' lack of knowledge and understanding of ADR,134 the high costs at stake in settlements (between $5 and $50 million),l3II the lack of incentives for the
agency to engage in ADR,136 the lack of time and resources to
negotiate,137 and the EPA's perception that use of ADR means
engaging in mixed-funding settlements which will deplete the
"super" fund. 1s6
C.

A CASE EXAMPLE: CALIFORNIA'S ATTEMPT AT MERGING ARBI-

TRATION AND SUPERFUND

One of the key ingredients to a successful settlement is cost
allocation among the major potentially responsible parties. 139 If
the settlement is to produce a voluntary cleanup by the PRPs,
then a consensus must be reached on the appropriate remedy,
total costs, and distribution of liability.140 Although CERCLA
provides no mechanism to resolve cost allocation disputes, California's state superfund law allows for the use of binding arbitration to apportion liability for the cost of removal and remedial actions. HI
California's law creates an arbitration panel chosen from a
list of independent private arbitrators who have applied to the
133. ADR Guidance, supra note 86, at 35124.
134. Cassel, Negotiating Better Superfund Settlements: Prospects and Protocols,
16 Pepperdine L. Rev. S117, S160: Also Telephone Interview with David Batson, supra
note 131. Batson noted that the ignorance on alternative dispute resolution techniques
exacerbates the EPA's fear that submitting to ADR will mean loss of control. He mentioned time and ADR successes as the solution to this problem.
135. Cassel, supra note 136 at 164.
136. [d. at 165.
137. [d. See also EPA's region V case studies, supra note 84.
138. Krickenberger, supra note 129, at 246. Mixed funding settlements are those
where both EPA and private party funds are used to clean up the site. As this depletes
"the fund," this is not a goal of EPA enforcement officials. SARA, supra note 125, §
122(b) at 1679. See also, Habicht, supra note 29, at 47.
139. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially Responsible Parties: The Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10158 (1988), also Garrett, Superfund: Apportionment of Liability, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 25 (1985).
140. Cohen, supra note 141.
141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25356.1-3 (West 1991). Remedial Action Plans
are plans for permanent remedies or removals prepared pursuant to CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25356.1 (West 1991).
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State's Office of Environmental Affairs for membership. Three
arbitrators are chosen for each dispute, one selected by an
agency of the state, another by a majority of the PRPs who have
submitted to binding arbitration, and the third arbitrator, by
the two previously-selected arbitrators.142
However, certain conditions must exist before a party can
submit to an arbitration proceeding. A remedial action plan
(RAP) must be completed by the Department of Health Services, wherein all potentially responsible parties are identified;
only those PRPs listed in the RAP with an aggregate alleged
liability in excess of 50 percent of the costs of removal and remedial action can elect to submit to binding arbitration; and those
parties must file a request for an arbitration plan within 15 days
after the remedial plan was issued. 143 Further, the RAP must
contain a preliminary non-binding allocation of responsibility
(N-BAR) which the state agency can write in such a way as to
invoke or not invoke arbitration. 1•• The N-BAR thus gives the
state complete discretionary power over the submission of cost
allocation to arbitration. l46 If the case is an appropriate one for
arbitration and the above factors are met, then the panel will
apportion liability based on pre-determined factors. I.e
142. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.2 (West 1991). This arbitration procedure
is quite different than the one recommended by the EPA for small cost recovery claims.
For cost recovery, EPA's guidelines provide for one arbitrator chosen from a national
panel of environmental arbitrators established by the association offering arbitration services to the EPA. From this panel the association sends a list of 10 of its arbitrators to
the parties involved. Each party then has 10 days from the receipt of this list to object to
any of the arbitrators and select the remaining persons in the order of preference. From
among the persons the parties have deemed acceptable, the association then picks one.
See Arbitration Procedures for Small Superfund Cost Recovery Claims, supra note 132
at 23182.
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.3 (West 1991).
144. Telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, Esq, Senior Attorney and Administrator for the Hazardous Substance Arbitration Panel, California state Office of Environmental Affairs (Feb. 1, 1991).
145. [d.
146. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.3(c)(I-5) (West 1991). The California statute requires the panel to apportion liability based on all of the following criteria:
(1) The amount of hazardous substance for which each party may be responsible.
(2) The degree of toxicity of the hazardous substance.
(3) The degree of involvement of the potentially responsible parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, or disposal of the hazardous substance.
(4) The degree of care exercised by the potentially responsible parties with respect
to the hazardous substances.
(5) The degree of cooperation by the potentially responsible parties with federal,
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Each PRP whose liability is determined by the panel is then
held accountable for the apportioned share of the costs of removal and remedial action at the site. Upon full payment of the
apportioned share or full cleanup of the site, the PRP is released
from any additional civil liability to any governmental entity
and may seek indemnity from any other persons liable for the
party's apportioned share, including government agencies. I "7
However, recalcitrant PRPs subsequently found liable have no
right to indemnification from any party who participated in the
arbitration proceedings. us
The first arbitration was completed by the panel in 1986,
and to date, the panel has only been invoked on two other occasions. I "9 Although only 3 cases have been arbitrated, the longest
of those occupied only 5.5 days of hearing time. lllo
Members of the arbitration panel suggest that the stringent
criteria mandated by the statute inhibit any arbitration activity.11I1 One big impediment is the RAP requirement. Not only is
the RAP cumbersome and expensive, but it can take years to
complete. 11I2 In addition, limiting the jurisdiction of the panel to
only PRPs with an aggregate liability of over 50 percent excludes de minimis parties from the convenience and inexpensiveness of arbitration, unless they find other PRPs to fulfill the
50 percent requirement.
The EPA and California's state environmental agency have
both incorporated arbitration proceedings in their Superfund
bills, but have limited its application so severely as to make its
state, and local officials to prevent harm to human health and the environment.
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.6 (West 1991).- Additional civil liability;
modification of arbitration decisions; indemnification for removal or remedial actions.
148. Id.
149. The three hazardous waste sites in which cost allocation were arbitrated are the
following: In the matter of Hoopa Veneer/Humboldt FIR, (State of California Office of
Secretary of Environmental Affairs, Hazardous Substance Clean-up Arbitration Panel,
#86-011), In the Matter of Placerita Canyon Facility, (State of California Office of Secretary of Environmental Affairs, Hazardous Substance Clean-up Arbitration Panel, #870001), and In the Matter of El Capitan Site, (State of California Office of Secretary of
Environmental Affairs, Hazardous Substance Clean-up Arbitration Panel# 89-0102).
150. U.S. Not Motivated in CERCLA Disputes to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution, Env't. Rep. (BNA) (June 27, 1990) Also, telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver,
supra note 146.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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impact on accelerating Superfund settlements nominal. Where
EP A limited its scope by the monetary size of the suit, California limited its scope by limiting the persons who could use arbitration. Where EPA attempted to decrease its risk at stake by
arbitrating only small claims, California decreases its risk by requiring a cumbersome Remedial Action Plan to be prepared.
Both leave final discretionary authority to arbitrate with the
governmental agency, and both policies seem to stem from government fear of losing control in the settlement process. 153
California's Hazardous Substances Cleanup Arbitration
Panel is the only one of its kind in the United States, as it arbitrates one of the most critical issues in the settlement process:
cost allocation. l54 Widening the panel's jurisdiction to all PRPs
including de minimis parties would perhaps increase the use of
arbitration, which in turn would increase arbitration's popularity as PRPs and the government would realize the cost-effectiveness of this dispute resolution technique. 155
IV. ADR AND DE MINIMIS CONTRIBUTORS
Arbitration and the de minimis settlement mechanism are
both congressionally established methods of expediting settlements of hazardous waste site disputes. Yet both statutory provisions amount to giving settlement incentives to the government agency rather than the intended potentially responsible
party. For instance, in Superfund's de minimis provision and
California's arbitration statute, extensive studies must be completed before any settlement negotiation can be entertained. All
settlement tools discussed (de minimis, arbitration for cost recovery, and arbitration for cost allocation in California) grant
153. Also, Thomas Grumbley, then president of Clean Sites (an agency created to
help use ADR techniques in Superfund) testified "In all of these cases [ADR and mixed
funding] the Agency is collectively saying that it does not want to lose control of the
process. This is of course, an unnecessary worry, since the law clearly makes the Agency
the final arbitrator of any decision. Inside the Agency, however, there is a feeling that
the willingness to negotiate, to settle if you will, means loss of control." See Progress of
the Superfund Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
for the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, looth Cong., 2nd Sess. 58 (1988)(Statement of Thomas P. Grumbley, President of Clean Sites, Incorporated).
154. Telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, supra note 146.
155. This can be done by eliminating the NBAR requirement from the Remedial
Action Plan (RAP). Without the NBAR, any potentially responsible party can submit to
arbitration. See telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, supra note 146.
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the government agency final discretionary authority to invoke
the settlement tool. 1116 And, just as EPA initially refused to enter
into settlement negotiations representing less than 80 percent of
a site's cleanup costs, California's Office of Environmental Affairs (OEA) refuses to invoke arbitration with PRPs representing less than 50 percent of the site's clean up costs. Further,
each government in drafting the settlement tool incorporated
risk minimization techniques. In de minimis settlements, the
federal government can reserve the right to re-open the settlement, negating the EPA's covenant-not-to-sue the de minimis
contributor given in exchange for that party's cash-out. In arbitration for cost recoveries, the federal government only allows
this form of ADR for cost recoveries less than $500,000 dollars.
Consequently, in the four years since its adoption, no cost recovery claims have been arbitrated. 11l7 Thus, more is needed than
just congressional approval or authorization of these settlement
tools.
A congressional mandate to utilize ADR to facilitate the
identification of PRPs and to allocate cleanup costs could help
EP A meet the original intent for de minimis settlements - to
accelerate cleanups by expediting settlement negotiations. Specifically, binding arbitration to determine cost allocation among
identifiable PRPs would enable EPA and the PRPs to readily
ascertain those parties who are de minimis, consequently saving
money in transaction costs by early settlements, while receiving
money from the cash outs to begin response action.
ADR commentators have suggested other methods of ADR
to allocate PRP responsibility. Common suggestions are forms of
non-binding ADR such as mediation or neutral fact-finders. IllS
Yet,as these forms are non-binding, EPA is not bound by the
156. The de minimis provision leaves EPA as the final interpreter of its vague language, supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. California's superfund bill also mandates that the government agency has the final say. See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
157. Telephone conversation with Janice Linnett, U.S. Environmental Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (Feb. 4, 1991).
158. See generally, Cassel, supra note 121. Cassel suggests that EPA use mediators
to arrange for de minimis settlements because they provide for "varied solutions." See
also, Susskind, The Special Master as Environmental Mediator, 17 ENvTL. L. REP. 10239
(1987). (Mediation suggested for cost allocation because it creates a high degree of voluntary compliance).
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result in any subsequent negotiation or litigation and the decision is not admissible in any lawsuit. The effect is similar to the
SARA-established NBARlll9 (non-binding preliminary allocation
of responsibility) which was also added to SARA to expedite settlements. Commentators suggest that NBARs rarely succeed because the result is not binding on the government or the PRPs,
making their utility as a settlement tool limited. 16o
However, binding arbitration has proven successful when invoked in cost allocation disputes. 16l The pure fact that it is
binding ensures the probability that settlements will be resolved
quickly and efficiently. The result will be lower transaction costs
for all parties involved, and the goal of de minimis contributor
settlements will be achieved.
Mediation may be better to determine a party's eligibility as
a de minimis contributor. As this must be decided on a case-bycase basis, no legislation can create a formula to hasten this process. Yet third-party neutrals may be ideally situated to work
with the small contributor and the government agency to establish the party's qualifications as a de minimis contributor. Of
course, if arbitrators allocated liability early, de minimis status
could be based on the binding. results of the arbitrator's
decision.
V.

CONCLUSION

EP A has created as many devices to avoid settlements as
Congress has to create them. Although both branches of the government seem to acknowledge the advantages of alternative dispute resolution in negotiating settlements, EPA's nominal use of
such techniques should send a caveat to Congress when and if it
chooses to amend Superfund a second time. In sum, where the
EP A is faced with the competing goals of a strict enforcement
159. SARA, supra note 125, § 122(e)(3) at 1682.-"The President shall develop guidelines for preparing nonbinding preliminary allocations of responsibility. In developing
these guidelines the President may include such factors as the President considers relevant such as: volume, toxicity, mobility, strength of evidence, ability to pay... When it
would expedite settlements under this section and remedial action, the President may,
after completion of the remedial investigation and feasibility study, provide a non-binding preliminary allocation of responsibility which allocates percentages of the total cost
of response among potentially responsible parties at the facility."
160. Cohen, supra note 141. See also Balcke, supra note 9.
161. See infra note 164.
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policy and facilitating settlements, the strict enforcement policy
has won.
California has ventured into the unknown waters of ADR
and discovered its incredible advantages. 162 Its statute is the
first of its kind in the country,168 and as such could serve as a
model for Congress to improve upon, having the benefit of retrospect. Growing support of ADR exists in the private sector, Congress, and the EPA. To make it work in Superfund cases, EPA
must be willing to share its enforcement authority with ADR.
Jennifer Martin*

162. In a letter to California's Secretary of Environmental Affairs regarding the first
arbitration by the Hazardous Substance Cleanup Arbitration Panel, California's Department of Health Services' Chief Deputy Director wrote, "We believe this case was a success because of the judicious and efficient manner in which the arbitration was conducted and the positive impact arbitration had on the cleanup of this hazardous waste
site... this cleanup occurred in an expeditious manner because the responsible party
was confident that the arbitration process would provide a fair and binding allocation of
responsibility." Letter from Alex Cunningham, Chief Deputy Director, Department of
Health Services, to Ms. Jananne Sharpless, Secretary of Environmental Affairs (Dec. 18,
1987).
.
163. Telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, see supra note 146.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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